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Abstract. Adversarial attacks are valuable for providing insights into the blind-
spots of deep learning models and help improve their robustness. Existing work
on adversarial attacks have mainly focused on static scenes; however, it remains
unclear whether such attacks are effective against embodied agents, which could
navigate and interact with a dynamic environment. In this work, we take the first
step to study adversarial attacks for embodied agents. In particular, we generate
spatiotemporal perturbations to form 3D adversarial examples, which exploit the
interaction history in both the temporal and spatial dimensions. Regarding the
temporal dimension, since agents make predictions based on historical observa-
tions, we develop a trajectory attention module to explore scene view contribu-
tions, which further help localize 3D objects appeared with highest stimuli. By
conciliating with clues from the temporal dimension, along the spatial dimen-
sion, we adversarially perturb the physical properties (e.g., texture and 3D shape)
of the contextual objects that appeared in the most important scene views. Exten-
sive experiments on the EQA-v1 dataset for several embodied tasks in both the
white-box and black-box settings have been conducted, which demonstrate that
our perturbations have strong attack and generalization abilities. §
Keywords: Embodied Agents, Spatiotemporal Perturbations, 3D Adversarial Ex-
amples
1 Introduction
Deep learning has demonstrated remarkable performance in a wide spectrum of areas
[22, 28, 34], but it is vulnerable to adversarial examples [35, 14, 7]. The small perturba-
tions are imperceptible to human but easily misleading deep neural networks (DNNs),
thereby bringing potential security threats to deep learning applications [30, 24, 25].
Though challenging deep learning, adversarial examples are valuable for understand-
ing the behaviors of DNNs, which could provide insights into the weakness and help
improve the robustness [43]. Over the last few years, significant efforts have been made
? Corresponding author. Email: xlliu@nlsde.buaa.edu.cn
§ Our code can be found at https://github.com/liuaishan/SpatiotemporalAttack.
2 Liu et al.
to explore model robustness to the adversarial noises using adversarial attacks in the
static and non-interactive domain, e.g., 2D images [14, 2, 11] or static 3D scenes [42,
26, 38].
With great breakthroughs in multimodal techniques and virtual environments, em-
bodied task has been introduced to further foster and measure the agent perceptual abil-
ity. An agent must intelligently navigate a simulated environment to achieve specific
goals through egocentric vision [8, 9, 41, 15]. For example, an agent is spawned in a
random location within an environment to answer questions such as “What is the color
of the car?”. Das et al. [8] first introduced the embodied question answering (EQA)
problem and proposed a model consisting of a hierarchical navigation module and a
question answering module. Concurrently, Gordon et al. [15] studied the EQA task in
an interactive environment named AI2-THOR [20]. Recently, several studies have been
proposed to improve agent performance using different frameworks [9] and point cloud
perception [37]. Similar to EQA, embodied vision recognition (EVR) [40] is an em-
bodied task, in which an agent instantiated close to an occluded target object to perform
visual object recognition.
A: Bathroom!
Q: What room is the 
chessboard located in?
Forward
Left
Right
Adversarial Textures
Forward
Fig. 1. Embodied agents must navigate the environment through egocentric views to answer given
questions. By adversarially perturbing the physical properties of 3D objects using our spatiotem-
poral perturbations, the agent gives the wrong answer (the correct answer is “living room”) to the
question. The contextual objects perturbed are: sofa and laptop.
In contrast to static tasks, embodied agents are free to move to different locations
and interact with the dynamic environment. Rather than solely using a one-shot image,
embodied agents observe 3D objects from different views and make predictions based
on historical observations (trajectory). Current adversarial attacks mainly focused on
the static scenes and ignored the information from the temporal dimension. However,
since agents utilize contextual information to make decisions (i.e., answer questions),
only considering a single image or an object appeared in one scene view may not be
sufficient to generate strong adversarial attacks for the embodied agent.
In this work, we provide the first study of adversarial attacks for embodied agents
in dynamic environments, as demonstrated in Figure 1. By exploiting the interaction
history in both the temporal and spatial dimensions, our adversarial attacks generate
3D spatiotemporal perturbations. Regarding the temporal dimension, since agents make
predictions based on historical observations, we develop a trajectory attention module to
explore scene view contributions, which could help to localize 3D objects that appeared
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with highest stimuli for agents’ predictions. Coupled with clues from the temporal di-
mension, along the spatial dimension, we adversarially perturb the physical properties
(e.g., 3D shape, and texture) of the contextual objects that appeared in the most impor-
tant scene views. Currently, most embodied agents input 2D images transformed and
processed from 3D scenes by undifferentiable renderers. To apply the attack using a
gradient-based strategy, we replace the undifferentiable renderer with a differentiable
one by introducing a neural renderer [19].
To evaluate the effectiveness of our spatiotemporal adversarial attacks, we conduct
extensive experiments in both the white-box and black-box settings using different
models. We first demonstrate that our generated 3D adversarial examples are able to
attack the state-of-the-art embodied agent models and significantly outperform other
3D adversarial attack methods. Also, our adversarial perturbations can be transferred to
attack the black-box renderer using non-differentiable operations, indicating the appli-
cability of our attack strategy, and the potential of extending it to the physical world.
We also provide a discussion of adversarial training using our generated attacks, and a
perceptual study indicating that contrary to the human vision system, current embod-
ied agents are mostly more sensitive to object textures rather than shapes, which sheds
some light on bridging the gap between human perception and embodied perception.
2 Related Work
Adversarial examples or perturbations are intentionally designed inputs to mislead deep
neural networks [35]. Most existing studies address the static scene including 2D im-
ages and static 3D scenes.
In the 2D image domain, Szegedy et al. [35] first introduced adversarial examples
and used the L-BFGS method to generate them. By leveraging the gradients of the target
model, Goodfellow et al. [14] proposed the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) which
could generate adversarial examples quickly. In addition, Mopuri et al. [29] proposed
a novel approach to generate universal perturbations for DNNs for object recognition
tasks. These methods add perturbations on 2D image pixels rather than 3D objects and
fail to attack the embodied agents.
Some recent work study adversarial attacks in the static 3D domain. A line of work
[38, 42, 26] used differentiable renderers to replace the undifferentiable one, and per-
form attacks through gradient-based strategies. They mainly manipulated object shapes
and textures in 3D visual recognition tasks. On the other hand, Zhang et al. [44] learned
a camouflage pattern to hide vehicles from being detected by detectors using an approx-
imation function. Adversarial patches [5, 24] have been studied to perform real-world
3D adversarial attacks. In particular, Liu et al. [24] proposed the PS-GAN framework to
generate scrawl-like adversarial patches to fool autonomous-driving systems. However,
all these attacks mainly considered the static scenes and ignored the temporal infor-
mation. Our evaluation demonstrates that by incorporating both spatial and temporal
information, our spatiotemporal attacks are more effective for embodied tasks.
Another line of work studies adversarial attacks against reinforcement learning
agents [13, 21, 18, 31, 23]. These works mainly consider adversarial attacks against re-
inforcement learning models trained for standard game environments, where the model
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input only includes the visual observation. For example, most of existing work focuses
on single-agent tasks such as Atari [4], while Gleave et al. [13] studied adversarial at-
tacks in multi-agent environments. Different from prior work, we focus on tasks related
to embodied agents (i.e., EQA and EVR), with richer input features including both vi-
sion and language components.
3 Adversarial Attacks for the Embodiment
The embodiment hypothesis is the idea that intelligence emerges in the interaction of an
agent with an environment and as a result of sensorimotor activity [33, 8]. To achieve
specific goals, embodied agents are required to navigate and interact with the dynamic
environment through egocentric vision. For example, in the EQA task, an agent is
spawned at a random location in a 3D dynamic environment to answer given questions
through navigation and interaction.
3.1 Motivations
Though showing promising results in the virtual environment, the agent robustness is
challenged by the emergence of adversarial examples. Most of the agents are built upon
deep learning models which have been proved to be weak in the adversarial setting [35,
14]. By performing adversarial attacks to the embodiment, an adversary could manip-
ulate the embodied agents and force them to execute unexpected actions. Obviously, it
would pose potential security threats to agents in both the digital and physical world.
From another point of view, adversarial attacks for the embodiment are also bene-
ficial to understand agents’ behaviors. As black-box models, most deep-learning-based
agents are difficult to interpret. Thus, adversarial attacks provide us with a new way
to explore model weakness and blind-spots, which are valuable to understand their be-
haviors in the adversarial setting. Further, we can improve model robustness and build
stronger agents against noises.
3.2 Problem Definition
In this paper, we use 3D adversarial perturbations (adversarial examples) to attack em-
bodied agents in a dynamic environment.
In a static scenario, given a deep neural network Fθ and an input image I with
ground truth label y, an adversarial example Iadv is the input that makes the model
conducted the wrong label
Fθ(Iadv) 6= y s.t. ‖I− Iadv‖ < ε,
where ‖ · ‖ is a distance metric to quantify the distance between the two inputs I and
Iadv sufficiently small.
For the embodiment, an agent navigates the environment to fulfil goals and observe
3D objects in different time steps t. The input image It at time step t for an agent is
the rendered result of a 3D object from a renderer R by It = R(x, ct). x is the cor-
responding 3D object and ct denotes conditions at t (e.g., camera views, illumination,
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etc.). To attack the embodiment, we need to consider the agent trajectory in temporal
dimension and choose objects to perturb in the 3D spatial space. In other words, we
generate adversarial 3D object xadv by perturbing its physical properties at multiple
time steps. The rendered image set {I1, ..., IN} is able to fool the agent Fθ:
Fθ(R(xadvt , ct)) 6= y s.t. ‖xt − xadvt ‖ < ε,
where t belongs to a time step set we considered.
Temporal Sequence
Spatial Context
3D Scene
Move & See
Fusion
…
Adversarial Attack Adv 3D Scene
Differentiable
Renderer
0.25 0.78 0.13
⋮ ⋮ ⋮
0.36 0.11 0.64
Physical Parameters
Predictions
Fig. 2. Our framework exploits interaction histories from both the temporal and the spatial di-
mension. In the temporal dimension, we develop a trajectory attention module to explore scene
view contributions. Thus, important scene views are extracted to help localize 3D objects that
appeared with highest stimuli for agents predictions. By conciliating with clues from the tempo-
ral dimension, along the spatial dimension, we adversarially perturb the 3D properties (e.g., 3D
shape, and texture) of the contextual objects appeared in the most important scene views.
4 Spatiotemporal Attack Framework
In this section, we illustrate our framework to generate 3D adversarial perturbations for
embodied agents in the dynamic environment. In Figure 2, we present an overview of
our attack approach, which incorporates history interactions from both the temporal and
spatial dimensions.
Motivated by the fact that agents make predictions based on historical scene views
(trajectory), we attack the 3D objects appeared in scene views containing the highest
stimuli to the agent’s prediction. In the temporal dimension, we develop a trajectory
attention module A to explore scene view contributions, which directly calculates the
contribution weight for each time step scene view {I1, ..., IN} to the agent prediction
Fθ. Given a N -step trajectory, the K most important historical scene views S are se-
lected by A to help localize 3D objects that appeared with highest stimuli.
Meanwhile, rather than solely depending on single objects, humans always collect
discriminative contextual information when making predictions. By conciliating with
clues from the temporal dimension, along the spatial dimension, we adversarially per-
turb the physical properties φ of multiple 3D contextual objects X appeared in the most
important scene views. Moreover, to attack physical properties (i.e., 3D shapes and tex-
tures), we also employ a differentiable renderer Rδ to use the gradient-based attacks.
Thus, by coupling both temporal and spatial information, our framework generates
spatiotemporal perturbations to form 3D adversarial examples, which could perform
adversarial attacks for the embodiment.
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4.1 Temporal Attention Stimulus
To achieve specific goals, embodied agents are required to navigate the environment
and make decisions based on the historical observations. Conventional vision tasks,
e.g., classification, mainly base on one-shot observation in static images. In contrast,
we should consider historical information (trajectory) such as last N historical scene
views observed by the agent H = {It−N , It−N+1, ..., It−1}, and adversarially perturb
the 3D objects that appeared in them. Thus, we can formulate the attack loss:
Ladv(H, y;Fθ) = P(y|H), (1)
where P(·|·) denotes the prediction probability of the model, and y indicates the ground
truth label (i.e., correct answer, object class or action w.r.t. question answering, visual
recognition and navigation, respectively). To attack agents, the equation above aims to
decrease the confidence of the correct class.
There is extensive biological evidence that efficient perception requires both spe-
cialized visual sensing and a mechanism to prioritize stimuli, i.e., visual attention.
Agents move their eyes towards a specific location or focus on relevant locations to
make predictions by prioritizing different scene views [6]. To perform strong adversar-
ial attacks, we must design a visual attention module that selects a suitable set of visual
features (historical scene views) to perform attack. Inspired by [32], given scene views
H, we first compute the gradient of target class y w.r.t. normalized feature maps Z of a
specified layer. These gradients flowing back are global average pooled to obtain weight
wt for the t-th scene view:
wt = max(0,
r∑
n=1
1
u× v
v∑
j=1
u∑
i=1
∂P(y|H)
∂Zni,j
), (2)
where u × v represents the size of the feature map, and r indicates total feature map
numbers in a specified layer. Then, We normalize each weight according to their mean
vector µ and variance vector σ:
wt =
wt − µ
σ2 + ε
, (3)
Thus, our trajectory attention module calculates the contribution of each scene view
in the trajectory H towards the model decision for class y:
A(H, y;Fθ) = 〈w1, ...,wN 〉. (4)
The weights directly reflect the contribution of observed views at different time
steps in the trajectory. Thus, we can further adversarially perturb the 3D objects that
appeared in those scene views containing higher weights to execute a stronger attack.
4.2 Spatially Contextual Perturbations
Adversarial attacks in the static scene usually manipulate pixel values in the static im-
age or different frames. In contrast, adversarial attacks for the embodiment require us
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to perturb the physical properties of 3D objects. Simply, we could randomly choose an
object appeared in the most important scene views based on the attention weights to
perform attacks. However, when humans look at an object, they always collect a dis-
criminative context for that object [12]. In other words, we concentrate on that object
while simultaneously being aware of its surroundings and context. The contextual in-
formation enables us to perform much stronger adversarial attacks. As shown in Figure
1, when asking “What room is the chessboard located in?”, it is better to perturb con-
textual objects rather than only the target object “chessboard”. To answer the question,
agent relied on contextual objects (e.g., sofa, laptop, etc), that convey critical factors
and key features about the answer “living room”.
Coupled with the clues from the temporal dimension, we further perturb the 3D
contextual objects appeared in the K most important views. Specifically, given K most
important scene views selected by our trajectory attention module S = {S1, ...,SK},
we perturbM 3D objects X = {x1, ...,xM} appeared in S. Thus, the adversarial attack
loss can be formalized as:
Ladv(X, y;Fθ,Rδ) = P(y|S,Rδ(X, c)). (5)
Let φm be the 3D physical parameters of object xm (e.g., texture, shape, etc). With
the contribution weight w for the K most important scene views, we add the following
perturbation to φm:
∆φm =
K∑
k=1
1(xm ∈ Φ(Sk)) ·wk·
∇φmLadv(xm, y;Fθ,Rδ),
(6)
where Φ(·) extracts the objects appeared in scene views.
4.3 Optimization Formulations
Based on the above discussion, we generate 3D adversarial perturbations using the op-
timization formulation:
L(X;Fθ,Rδ) = Ec∼C
[
Ladv(X, y;Fθ,Rδ, c)+
λ · Lper(X,Xadv;Rδ, c)
]
,
(7)
where we append the adversarial attack loss with a perceptual loss:
Lper(x,xadv;Rδ, c) = ||Rδ(x, c)− Rδ(xadv, c)||, (8)
which constrains the magnitude of the total noises added to produce a visually imper-
ceptible perturbation. C represents different conditions (e.g., camera views, illumina-
tion, etc.) and λ balances the contribution of each part.
Recent studies have highlighted that adversarial perturbations are ineffective to dif-
ferent transformations and environmental conditions (e.g., illuminations, rotations, etc).
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In the dynamic environment, the viewing angles and environmental conditions change
frequently. Thus, we further introduce the idea of expectation of transformations [3]
to enhance the attack success rate of our perturbations as shown in the expectation of
different conditions C in Eqn (7). Specifically, for each object to attack, we select five
positional views one meter away with an azimuth angle uniformly ranging from [0◦,
180◦] to optimize the overall loss.
It is intuitive to directly place constraints on physical parameters such as the contour
or color range of object surfaces. However, one potential disadvantage is that different
physical parameters have different units and ranges. Therefore, we constrain the RGB
intensity changes in the 2D image space after the rendering process to keep the consis-
tency of the change of different parameters (i.e., shape or texture).
5 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our 3D spatiotemporal adversarial at-
tacks against agents in different settings for different embodied tasks. We also provide
a discussion of defense with adversarial training, and an ablation study of how different
design choices affect the attack performance.
5.1 Experimental Setting
For both EQA and EVR tasks, we use the EQA-v1 dataset [8], a visual question answer-
ing dataset grounded in the simulated environment. It contains 648 environments with
7,190 questions for training, 68 environments with 862 questions for validation, and 58
environments with 933 questions for testing. It divides the task into T−10, T−30, T−50
by steps from the starting point to the target. We restrict the adversarial perturbations to
be bounded by 32-pixel values per frame of size 224× 224, in terms of `∞ norm.
5.2 Evaluation Metrics
To measure agent performance, we use the following evaluation metrics as in [8, 37, 9]:
- top-1 accuracy: whether the agent’s prediction matches ground truth (↑ is better);
- dT : the distance to the target object at navigation termination (↓ is better);
- d∆: change in distance to target from initial to the final position (↑ is better);
- dmin: the smallest distance to the target at any point in the episode (↓ is better);
Note that the goal of adversarial attacks is compromising the performance of the
embodied agents, i.e., leading to worse values of the evaluation metrics above.
5.3 Implementation Details
We use the SGD optimizer for adversarial perturbation generation, with momentum
0.9, weight decay 10−4, and a maximum of 60 iterations. For the hyper-parameters
of our framework, we set λ to 1, K to 3, and M as the numbers of all contextual
objects observed in these frames. For EQA, we generate adversarial perturbations using
PACMAN-RL+Q [8] as the target model, and we use Embodied Mask R-CNN [40]
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as the target model for EVR. In our evaluation, we will demonstrate that the attacks
generated against one model could transfer to different models.
For both EQA and EVR, unless otherwise specified, we generate adversarial pertur-
bations on texture only, i.e., in Equation 6, we only update the parameters corresponding
to texture, because it is more suitable for future extension to physical attacks in the real
3D environment. In the supplementary material, we also provide a comparison of ad-
versarial perturbations on shapes, where we demonstrate that with the same constraint
of perturbation magnitude, texture attacks achieve a higher attack success rate.
Table 1. Quantitative evaluation of agent performance on EQA task using different models in
clean and adversarial settings (ours, MeshAdv [38] and Zeng et al. [42]). Note that the goal of
attacks is to achieve a worse performance. We observe that our spatiotemporal attacks outperform
the static 3D attack algorithms, achieving higher dT and dmin as well as lower d∆ and accuracy.
Navigation QA
dT (↓ is better) d∆ (↑ is better) dmin (↓ is better) accuracy (↑ is better)
T−10 T−30 T−50 T−10 T−30 T−50 T−10 T−30 T−50 T−10 T−30 T−50
PACMAN-RL+Q
Clean 1.05 2.43 3.82 0.10 0.45 1.86 0.26 0.97 1.99 50.23% 44.19% 39.94%
MeshAdv 1.06 2.44 3.90 0.09 0.44 1.78 0.31 1.17 2.33 16.07% 15.34% 13.11%
Zeng et al. 1.07 2.46 3.88 0.08 0.42 1.80 0.42 1.37 2.43 17.15% 16.38% 14.32%
Ours 1.06 3.19 5.58 0.09 -0.39 0.10 0.90 2.47 5.33 6.17% 4.26% 3.42%
NAV-GRU
Clean 1.03 2.47 3.92 0.12 0.41 1.76 0.34 1.02 2.07 48.97% 43.72% 38.26%
MeshAdv 1.07 2.50 3.92 0.08 0.38 1.76 0.38 1.28 2.48 17.22% 17.01% 14.25%
Zeng et al. 1.09 2.47 3.87 0.06 0.41 1.81 0.36 1.38 2.51 17.14% 16.56% 15.11%
Ours 1.13 2.96 5.42 0.02 -0.08 0.26 0.96 2.58 4.98 8.41% 6.23% 5.15%
NAV-Reactive
Clean 1.37 2.75 4.17 -0.22 0.13 1.51 0.31 0.99 2.08 48.19% 43.73% 37.62%
MeshAdv 1.05 2.79 4.25 0.10 0.09 1.43 0.32 1.29 2.47 15.36% 14.78% 11.29%
Zeng et al. 1.10 2.79 4.21 0.05 0.09 1.47 0.36 1.59 2.32 15.21% 14.13% 13.29%
Ours 1.22 2.85 5.70 -0.07 0.03 -0.02 1.06 2.59 5.47 8.26% 5.25% 5.39%
VIS-VGG
Clean 1.02 2.38 3.67 0.13 0.50 2.01 0.38 1.05 2.26 50.16% 45.81% 37.84%
MeshAdv 1.06 2.41 3.67 0.09 0.47 2.01 0.40 1.11 2.52 16.69% 15.24% 15.21%
Zeng et al. 1.06 2.43 3.70 0.09 0.45 1.98 0.44 1.41 2.44 15.13% 14.84% 14.21%
Ours 1.18 2.83 5.62 -0.03 0.05 0.06 1.04 2.01 5.12 6.33% 4.84% 4.29%
5.4 Attack via a Differentiable Renderer
In this section, we provide the quantitative and qualitative results of our 3D adversarial
perturbations on EQA and EVR through our differentiable renderer. For EQA, besides
PACMAN-RL+Q, we also evaluate the transferability of our attacks using the follow-
ing models: (1) NAV-GRU, an agent using GRU instead of LSTM in navigation [37];
(2) NAV-Reactive, an agent without memory and fails to use historical information [8];
and (3) VIS-VGG, an agent using VGG to encode visual information [9]. For EVR, we
evaluate the white-box attacks on Embodied Mask R-CNN. As most of the embodied
tasks can be directly divided into navigation and problem-solving stages, i.e., question
answering or visual recognition, we attack each of these stages. We compare our spa-
tiotemporal attacks to MeshAdv [38] and Zeng et al. [42], both of which are designed
for the static 3D environment, and thus do not leverage the temporal information, as
discussed in Section 2.
For question answering and visual recognition, we generate 3D adversarial per-
turbations using our proposed method on the test set and evaluate agent performance
throughout the entire process, i.e., the agent is randomly placed and navigate to answer
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Forward Turn Right Turn Right Turn Right Stop
(a) Clean Scene
Forward Turn Right Turn Right Turn Right Stop
(b) Adversarial Scene
Fig. 3. Given the question “What is next to the fruit bowl in the living room?”, we show the
last 5 views of the agent for EQA in the same scene with and without adversarial perturbations.
The contextual objects perturbed including table, chairs and fruit bowel. The agent gives wrong
answers “television” to the question (ground truth: chair) after seeing adversarial textures in sub-
figure (b). Yellow boxes show the perturbed texture regions.
a question or recognize an object. As shown in Table 1, for white-box attacks, there is a
significant drop in question answering accuracy from 50.23%, 44.19% and 39.94% to
6.17%, 4.26% and 3.42% for tasks with 10, 30, and 50 steps, respectively. Further, the
visual recognition accuracy drastically decreases from 89.91% to 18.32%. The black-
box attacks also result in a large drop in accuracy. The visualization of the last five
steps before the agent’s decision for EQA is shown in Figure 3. Our perturbations are
unambiguous for human prediction but misleading to the agent.
For navigation, we generate 3D adversarial perturbations that intentionally stop the
agent, i.e., make the agent predict Stop during the navigation process. As shown in Table
1, for both white-box and black-box attacks, the values of dT and dmin significantly
increase compared to the clean environment when adding our perturbations, especially
for long-distance tasks, i.e., T−50. Further, the values of d∆ decreases to around 0 after
attack, which reveals that agents make a small number of movements or meaningless
steps to the destination. Also, some d∆ even become negative, showing that the agent
is moving away from the target.
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. The attention maps of different models. In both scenes (a) and (b), the first line presents the
attention maps of PACMAN-RL+Q, and the second line presents those of VIS-VGG. We observe
that the attention zones highlight similar context of the scenes for prediction.
Attention similarity. Further, to understand the transferability of attacks between
different models, we investigate their attention correlation. We first visualize the atten-
tion map of the last 5 views using PACMAN-RL+Q and VIS-VGG in Figure 4, and we
observe that the attention zones highlight similar context of the scenes for prediction.
Moreover, we compare the top-3 important views between PACMAN-RL+Q and VIS-
VGG on 32 questions, and we find that 83.33% of the included views are the same for
both models. Such attention similarities between different models could facilitate the
transferability of black-box attacks.
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In a word, our generated 3D adversarial perturbations achieve strong attack perfor-
mance in both the white-box and black-box settings for navigation and problem-solving
in the embodied environment.
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Fig. 5. Transferability of attacks when presented with a black-box renderer. Method (1) to (4)
represents PACMAN-RL+Q, NAV-GRU, NAV-Reactive and VIS-VGG, respectively. Our frame-
work generates adversarial perturbations with strong transferabilities to black-box renderers.
5.5 Transfer Attack onto a non-differentiable Renderer
Our proposed framework aims to adversarially attack Fθ(Rδ(x1,x2, ...,xn)) by end-to-
end gradient-based optimization. In this section, we further examine the potential of our
framework in practice, where no assumptions about the non-differentiable renderer are
given. By enabling interreflection and rich illumination, the non-differentiable renderer
can render images at high computational cost, such that the rendered 2D image is more
likely to be an estimate of real-world physics. Thus, these experiments are effective to
illustrate the transferability of generated adversarial perturbations and their potential in
practical scenarios.
Specifically, we use the original non-differentiable renderer R for EQA-V1, which
is implemented on OpenGL with unknown parameters, as the black-box renderer. We
first generate 3D adversarial perturbations using our neural renderer Rδ , then save the
perturbed scenes. We evaluate agent performance through the non-differentiable ren-
dererR on those perturbed scenes to test the transferability of our adversarial perturba-
tions.
As shown in Figure 5, our spatiotemporal attacks can easily be transferred to a
black-box renderer. However, our generated adversarial perturbations are less effec-
tive at attacking the non-differentiable renderer compared to the neural renderer. Many
recent studies have reported that attacking the 3D space is much more difficult than
attacking the image space [42, 38]. Further, we believe there are three other reasons for
this phenomenon: (1) During the experiment, we save the perturbed scenes into files
after attacking Rδ and then feed these files to R to test the performance. During this
step, there inevitably exists some information loss, which may decrease the attack suc-
cess rate. Specifically, to generate attacks for the non-differentiable renderer, we first
generate 3D adversarial perturbations using a differentiable renderer, then save the per-
turbed scenes into OBJ, MTL, and JPG files (the required files of the non-differentiable
renderer to render a 3D scene) and feed them to the renderer. The information loss
comes from the JPG compression process. (2) The parameter difference between Rδ
and R may causes some minute rendering differences for the same scenarios. As ad-
versarial examples are very sensitive to image transformations [39, 16], the attacking
ability is impaired; (3) The adversarial perturbation generated by optimization-based or
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gradient-based methods fails to obtain strong transferability due to either overfitting or
underfitting [10].
5.6 Generalization Ability of the Attack
In this section, we further investigate the generalization ability of our generated adver-
sarial perturbations. Given questions and trajectories, we first perturb the 3D objects
and save the scene. Then, loading the same perturbed scene, we ask agents different
questions and change their starting points to test their performance.
QA accuracy
T10 T30 T50
Clean 51.42% 42.68% 39.15%
Attack 6.05% 3.98% 3.52%
Q 10.17% 8.13% 7.98%
T 8.19% 7.26% 7.14%
Table 2. Generalization ability ex-
periments. Our 3D perturbations
generalize well in settings using dif-
ferent questions and starting points.
We first use the same perturbations on differ-
ent questions (denoted as “Q”). We fix the object
in questions during perturbation generation and test
to be the same. For example, we generate the pertur-
bations based on question “What is the color of the
table in the living-room?” and test the success rate
on question “What is next to the table in the living-
room?”. Moreover, we use the same perturbations
to test agents from different starting points (i.e.,
different trajectories, denoted as “T”). We first gen-
erate the perturbations and then test them by randomly spawning agents at different
starting points (i.e., random rooms and locations) under the same questions. As shown
in Table 2, the attacking ability drops a little compared to the baseline attack (generate
perturbation and test at the scene with the same questions and starting point, denoted as
“Attack”) in both setting with higher QA accuracy but still very strong, which indicates
the strong generalization ability of our spatiotemporal perturbations.
5.7 Improving Agent Robustness with Adversarial Training
Given the vulnerability of existing embodied agents with the presence of adversarial
Fig. 6. Visualization of scene with
different noises. From left to right:
clean, adversarial perturbations, and
Gaussian noises.
attacks, we study defense strategies to improve the
agent robustness. In particular, we base our defense
on adversarial training [14, 36, 27], where we inte-
grate our generated adversarial examples for model
training.
Training. We train 2 PACMAN-RL+Q models
augmented with adversarial examples (i.e., we gen-
erate 3D adversarial perturbations on object tex-
tures, denoted as AT ) or Gaussian noises (denoted
as GT ), respectively. We apply the common adver-
sarial training strategy that adds a fixed number of
adversarial examples in each epoch [14, 1], and we defer more experimental details in
the supplementary material.
Testing. We create a test set of 110 questions in 5 houses. As shown in Figure 6,
following [14, 17], we add different common noises including adversarial perturbations
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QA Navigation
Adv Gaussian Adv Gaussian
Vanilla 5.67% 22.14% 1.39 1.20
AT 23.56% 38.87% 1.17 1.01
GT 8.49% 32.90% 1.32 1.09
Table 3. Agent robustness in scenes
with adversarial perturbations and
gaussian noises. Adversarial training
provides the most robust agent.
and Gaussian noises. To conduct fair compar-
isons, adversarial perturbations are generated in
the white-box setting (e.g., for our adversarially
trained model, we generate adversarial perturba-
tions against it). The results in Table 3 support the
fact that training on our adversarial perturbations
can improve the agent robustness towards some
types of noises (i.e., higher QA accuracy, and lower
navigation dT ).
5.8 Ablation Study
Next, we present a set of ablation studies to further demonstrate the effectiveness of our
proposed strategy through different hyper-parameters K and M , i.e., different numbers
of historical scene views and contextual objects considered. All experiments in this
section are conducted on T−30. More results are in the Supplementary Material.
Historical scene views numbers. As for K, we set K=1,2,3,4,5, with a maximum
value of M=5. For a fair comparison, we set the overall magnitude of perturbations to
32/255. As shown in Figure 7 (a), for navigation, we nearly obtain the optimal attack
success rate whenK=3. The results are similar to the question answering. However, the
attack ability does not increase as significantly as that for navigation when increasing
K. Obviously, the agent mainly depends on the target object and contextual objects to
answer the questions. The contextual objects to be perturbed are quite similar to the
increasing number of historical scene views considered.
Contextual objects numbers. As for M , we set M=1,2,3,4,5,6 and K=3 to eval-
uate the contribution of the context to adversarial attacks. Similarly, we set the overall
magnitude of adversarial perturbations to 32/255 for adversarial attacks with different
M values, i.e., perturbations are added onto a single object or distributed to several con-
textual objects. As shown in Figure 7(b), the attack success rate increases significantly
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Fig. 7. Ablation study with different K and
M values in (a) and (b). Historical scene
views and contextual objects significantly
enhance our attacking ability.
with the increasing of M and converges
at around 5. The reason is the maximum
number of objects observable in 3 frames
is around 5 or 6. Further, by considering
the type of questions, we could obtain a
deeper understanding about how an agent
makes predictions. For questions about lo-
cation and composition, e.g., “What room is
the <OBJ> located in?” and “What is on
the <OBJ> in the <ROOM> ?”, the at-
tack success rate using context outperforms
single object attack significantly with 4.67%
and 28.51%, respectively. However, attacks
on color-related questions are only 3.56% and 9.88% after contextual attack and sin-
gle object attack, respectively. Intuitively, agents rely on different information to solve
different types of questions. According to the attention visualization study shown in
Figure 8, agents generally utilize clues from contextual objects to answer locational
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and compositional questions while mainly focus on target objects when predicting their
colors.
(a) (b)
Fig. 8. Visualization of last 5 views of the agent and corresponding attention maps. Subfigure
(a) denotes the locational and compositional question, and subfigure (b) represents the color-
related question. Agents use clues from contextual objects to answer locational and compositional
questions while mainly focus on target objects when predicting their colors.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we generate spatiotemporal perturbations to form 3D adversarial exam-
ples, which could attack the embodiment. Regarding the temporal dimension, since
agents make predictions based on historical observations, we develop a trajectory atten-
tion module to explore scene view contributions, which further help localize 3D objects
appeared with highest stimuli. By conciliating with clues from the temporal dimen-
sion, along the spatial dimension, we adversarially perturb the physical properties (e.g.,
texture, and 3D shape) of the contextual objects that appeared in the most important
scene views. Extensive experiments on the EQA-v1 dataset for several embodied tasks
in both the white-box and black-box settings are conducted, which demonstrate that our
framework has strong attack and generalization abilities.
Currently, most embodied tasks, especially EQA, could only be evaluated in the
simulated environment. In the future, we are interested in investigating the attack abil-
ities of our spatiotemporal perturbations in the real-world scenario. Using projection
or 3D printing, we could simply bring our perturbations into the real-world to attack
a real-world agent. Further, we would like to attack more different models (especially
non-end-to-end frameworks when applicable for EQA) on different platforms.
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